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Waive Goodbye to Appellate Review of
Plea Bargaining
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF APPELLATE WAIVER
PROVISIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have been arrested by federal law
enforcement officers and charged with felony criminal offenses—
perhaps drug crimes and related conspiracy charges. Assume
these crimes carry lengthy sentences of incarceration, even life
imprisonment. Pending trial, you remain at a federal detention
center because you cannot afford bail. An Assistant U.S. Attorney
arranges a proffer meeting with you and your court-appointed
attorney. If you agree to plead guilty to at least one of the crimes
charged, cooperate with the government, and provide information
that leads to the arrest and successful prosecution of others, the
government will suggest a more lenient sentence to the court. You
understand that you will be forfeiting a jury trial and its
accompanying rights, but there is one other important caveat: you
must also waive your right to appeal. Your attorney explains that
this means you cannot challenge any aspect of your plea bargain
or sentence, except as explicitly provided for in the agreement. In
effect, with the exception of a few enumerated circumstances,1 the
deal is final. Maybe this makes you nervous—after all, errors
might occur during the computation of your sentence—but the
prosecution is adamant about the inclusion of the appellate
waiver provision. You cannot risk a trial, a conviction, and a
harsher sentence, so you accept.
Fast forward a few months to sentencing: you have held
up your end of the deal, and the prosecution is satisfied with your
cooperation. As promised, the government suggests a more
lenient sentence to the court. In calculating your sentence,
however, the court arrives at a longer term of imprisonment than
you anticipated. You are certain that this sentence deprives you of
1

See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
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the full benefit of your bargain, so you appeal, despite your
promise not to do so. The appellate court determines that your
valid waiver of your appeal rights bars the action, and therefore,
the court cannot reach the merits of your argument. Instead of
dismissing your appeal—as is the general practice—the court
remands your case for resentencing, which would allow the
government to seek a higher sentence. Such was the case for
Christopher Erwin, a man who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
distribute and possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, and
waived his right to appeal. But when the sentencing judge
computed his sentence differently than Erwin expected,2 he
appealed. The Third Circuit held that his appeal was barred by a
valid waiver, and therefore when Erwin was resentenced, the
government could withdraw its motion for a more lenient
sentence.3 This case has opened the door for a similar fate to
befall other criminal defendants who enter into plea agreements
with appellate waiver provisions.4
Federal prosecutors have regularly included appellate
waiver provisions in written plea agreements since 1990, when
the Fourth Circuit first upheld their use in United States v.
Wiggins.5 In that case, the court noted that a defendant may
waive numerous constitutional rights—the right to a jury trial,
the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against selfincrimination—when negotiating a voluntary plea agreement.6
From this well-settled rule, the court extrapolated that a defendant
may also waive, in a valid plea agreement, the statutory right to
appeal.7 The court ultimately held that “a defendant who pleads
guilty, and expressly waives the statutory right to raise objections

See infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided United States v.
Erwin on August 26, 2014. United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2014), cert
denied, 136 S. Ct. 400 (2015).
4 The court considered “the novel question of what remedy is available to the
Government when a criminal defendant who knowingly and voluntarily executed a
waiver of right to appeal—and received valuable promises from the Government in
return—violates his plea agreement by filing an appeal.” Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit concluded that the defendant’s appeal was “within the scope of his
appellate waiver,” but instead of following the normal course of action—dismissing the
appeal—the court took the unprecedented step of holding that specific performance was
the appropriate remedy for the defendant’s breach of the plea agreement. Id. The court
remanded the case for de novo resentencing. Id.
5 United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1990).
6 Id.
7 Id.
at 53 (“If defendants can waive fundamental constitutional
rights[,] . . . surely they are not precluded from waiving procedural rights granted by
statute.” (quoting United States v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989))); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 (2012) (granting defendants the right to “file a notice of appeal in the district court
for review of an otherwise final sentence”).
2

3
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to a sentence, may not then seek to appeal the very sentence
which itself was part of the agreement.”8
Since Wiggins, appellate waivers have become entrenched
in federal criminal practice. Critics have argued that waivers are
“unethical and . . . further stack[ ] the deck in favor of the
government by putting defendants at a disadvantage.”9 In
essence, these waivers effectively preclude judicial review of plea
bargains, which dispose of most criminal cases.10
Federal prosecutors, on the other hand, defend these
waivers as promoting judicial economy and preventing frivolous
appeals.11 By confining the scope of a defendant’s right to appeal,
the case is disposed of with a greater air of finality, allowing the
government to focus its efforts on other open cases. Although the
federal government continues to sanction appellate waiver
provisions generally, the U.S. Attorney General has issued a new
departmental policy regarding waivers of claims of ineffectiveness
of counsel on appeal.12 On October 14, 2014, Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole distributed a memorandum to all federal
prosecutors, advising that they should no longer include
provisions in plea agreements that ask criminal defendants to
waive claims of ineffectiveness of counsel, regardless of when the
claims are raised.13 Although this new policy preserves a
defendant’s right to appeal a conviction if his trial counsel (or
appellate counsel in some cases) is ineffective, prosecutors remain
“free to request waivers of appeal and of post-conviction remedies
to the full extent permitted by law as a component of plea
discussions and agreements.”14 Thus, criminal defendants will

Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53.
Evan Perez, Justice Dept. Bars Waivers That Prevent Appeal, CNN (Oct.
14, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/14/us/justice-department-legal-advice/
[http://perma.cc/9FBU-AXTG].
10 Id.; see Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 127, 161 (1995) (“The right to appeal in criminal cases has been variously
described as ‘a fundamental element of procedural fairness’ and the ‘final guarantor of
the fairness of the criminal process.’ . . . At the core of how we perceive our criminal
justice system is a basic distrust of the awesome power of the state and its ability to
infringe upon individual rights. The potential for such an abuse of power by either the
prosecutor or the trial judge traditionally has been viewed as requiring the availability
of some form of corrective process such as the right to appeal.” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS 14 (1977)); David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History of
Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 518 (1990))).
11 Perez, supra note 9.
12 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice to All Federal Prosecutors (Oct. 14, 2014), http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/
doj-policy-on-waivers-of-claims-of-iac.pdf [http://perma.cc/QD89-GSUT].
13 Id.
14 Id.
8

9
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still likely be routinely asked to forfeit their right to appeal when
executing a written plea agreement.15
It is well established that plea agreements—including
those with appellate waiver provisions—are analyzed under the
standards of contract law.16 When the government breaches a plea
agreement, federal courts have considered specific performance17
to be an appropriate remedy.18 Some courts have also enforced
plea agreements where the defendant was the breaching party,19
although not when the defendant’s breach consisted of appealing
despite a waiver provision in the defendant’s plea agreement.
Generally, appellate courts “retain jurisdiction over an appeal by
a defendant who has signed an appellate-waiver”; a court will not,
however, reach the merits of such a case if a defendant
“knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal.”20 If the
appellate court deems the waiver valid, the appeal is dismissed.21
This note considers the applicability of the specific
performance remedy for a defendant’s breach of an unconditional
plea agreement, where the breach consists only of filing an appeal
theoretically precluded by a waiver provision. This note explores
constitutional principles, contractual principles, and public policy
implications in arguing that the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has abandoned its role as an arbiter of justice and fairness
in order to conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources.
Specifically, court-sanctioned threats of withdrawn leniency, an
15 Principally, this will prevent defendants from raising claims of error
regarding their sentence.
16 United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v.
Williams, 510 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d
Cir. 1998); see Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains; it seems natural
to argue that they should be regulated and evaluated accordingly.”).
17 “In essence, the remedy of specific performance enforces the execution of a
contract according to its terms . . . .” Specific Performance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (quoting G.W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 304 (5th ed. 1961)).
18 See United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2014); United States
v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1998) (“When the government breaches a plea
agreement, the general rule is to remand the case to the district court for a determination
whether to grant specific performance or to allow withdrawal of the plea.”) (remanding for
a full resentencing to remedy the government’s breach of the plea agreement); Kingsley v.
United States, 968 F.2d 109, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1992) (ordering specific performance where
the government breached its promise not to oppose the defendant’s placement in a lowsecurity federal camp facility).
19 See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (finding that defendant’s breach
of plea agreement by refusing to testify at codefendant’s retrial removed the double jeopardy
bar to prosecution of defendant on original charges where plea agreement provided that
parties would be returned to the status quo ante if defendant refused to testify).
20 United States v. Gonzalez-Melchor, 648 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007)).
21 See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (because the
defendant’s appellate waiver was valid and enforceable, the court dismissed the
sentencing appeal).
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enhanced sentence, further criminal charges, or a return to the
status quo ante22 may insulate, preclude the review of, and
perpetuate injustice or illegality in the plea bargaining process.
Criminal defendants with arguably meritorious claims of error on
appeal should not have to forego an appeal for fear that the court
will not only disagree with them, but will also subject them to
enhanced sentences or further charges. Considering the panoply of
rights criminal defendants already waive in order to plead guilty, it
is essential that defendants at least retain the right to the review of
the voluntariness of their decision to waive the right to appeal.
Part I of this note discusses the plea bargaining process
itself, the right to appeal and the waiver thereof, the relevant
contractual principles that govern the interpretation of plea
agreements, and the remedies available upon a breach of a plea
agreement. Part II discusses United States v. Erwin, focusing on
the Third Circuit’s holding that specific performance is available
as a remedy for the government when a criminal defendant
breaches a plea agreement by appealing despite waiving the right
to do so.23 Part III evaluates and critiques the Third Circuit’s
holding in Erwin and suggests alternative remedies. Providing
the government with the extraordinary remedy of specific
performance will effectively preclude review of plea agreements
and the validity of appellate waivers, even in the absence of a
cross-appeal or a government motion to enforce the appeal
waiver. The government should be prohibited from moving for
specific performance if it does not first move to dismiss the appeal
based on a valid waiver. The cross-appeal rule dictates that the
government may only raise an issue when it has been aggrieved
by a final judgment. This note concludes that in Erwin, the
government was not aggrieved by a final judgment and therefore
should not have been able to seek specific performance. The Third
Circuit’s erroneous approach in Erwin should not govern how
future courts address breaches of appellate waiver provisions;
rather, courts should only order the specific enforcement of such
provisions in extraordinary circumstances.

22 This would essentially wipe the slate clean—any and all promises tendered
by either the prosecution or the defendant would no longer be enforceable. The
government would be free to proceed as if the plea agreement had never been reached
and, if it desired, could prosecute the defendant accordingly.
23 Erwin, 765 F.3d 219. At this time, it does not appear that any other circuit
has followed suit, nor has the Supreme Court accepted the invitation to review the
Third Circuit’s new approach. Id., cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 400 (2015).
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Those accused of crimes are guaranteed certain
fundamental rights, many of which are enumerated in the U.S.
Constitution. Defendants may either avail themselves of these
rights, or bargain them away during the plea negotiation
process. Thus, it is important to understand precisely the nature
and value of the following guarantees the defendant forfeits in
order to plead guilty.
The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no
person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”24 The Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against not
only multiple prosecutions for the same offense, but also against
multiple punishments for the same offense.25 The prohibition on
compelled self-incrimination reflects the accused’s “free choice to
admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.”26 This right recognizes a
fundamental tenet of the American criminal justice system: it is
adversarial, not inquisitorial.27 Thus, government officials are
“constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured”; they may not coerce a suspect
to incriminate himself.28 Last is the Due Process Clause. The
Supreme Court has elaborated that a person is entitled to
“reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to
be heard,” requiring, at a minimum, the “right to examine
witnesses . . . and to be represented by counsel.”29
The Sixth Amendment further protects criminal
defendants, guaranteeing them fundamental trial rights. It assures
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,” to be
confronted by adverse witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel.30
The Speedy Trial Clause is designed to prevent unreasonable delay
between formal accusation and trial. A speedy trial decreases the
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
26 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 241 (1941)).
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id. at 8.
29 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948)).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24

25

2016]

WAIVE GOODBYE TO APPELLATE REVIEW

1243

likelihood of anxiety, lengthy pretrial incarceration, and
deterioration of the defendant’s case due to “dimming memories
and loss of exculpatory” or other favorable evidence.31 The most
serious form of prejudice is the last; a defendant’s ability to
adequately present a defense is at the core of a fair justice system.32
The Sixth Amendment also recognizes, and the Supreme Court
requires, a public and open trial “free of prejudice, passion,
excitement, and tyrannical power.”33 In fact, the “very purpose of a
court system [is] . . . to adjudicate controversies . . . in the calmness
and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures.”34
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause pertains to
trials themselves; the text applies to “‘witnesses’ against the
accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’”35 The
Confrontation Clause ultimately seeks to ensure the reliability
of evidence by exposing witness testimony to “the crucible of
cross-examination.”36 Although “the Sixth Amendment does not
by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the
attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses[,] it
guarantees him ‘compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor.’”37 The Supreme Court has emphasized that this right
“is in plain terms the right to present a defense”: the right to
provide the jury with the defendant’s own account of the facts so
that the jury may ultimately “decide where the truth lies.”38
The final guarantee provided by the Sixth Amendment is
the right to the assistance of counsel. It has been regarded as
one of the most significant rights in the criminal defendant’s
arsenal.39 The Supreme Court has held that the “right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”40 Only where a
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the
assistance of counsel can a court refuse to allow or furnish an

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992).
Id.
33 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (quoting Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940)).
34 Id. at 350-51 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting)).
35 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
36 Id. at 61.
37 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (emphasis
added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
38 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
39 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
40 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
31

32
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attorney for the defendant.41 Absent the rare case where a
defendant, of his own volition, proceeds pro se, the Court has
recognized that the average defendant, a lay person, faces a serious
disadvantage: the prosecution is “presented by experienced and
learned counsel,” whereas the defendant may lack “both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he
have a perfect one.”42
Lastly, though not explicitly stated in the Constitution, a
bedrock of the American criminal justice system has always been
the presumption of innocence.43 Therefore, a person accused of a
crime is entitled to the protection of this presumption until the
government proves the person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.44
Notwithstanding this plethora of constitutional safeguards,
criminal defendants may choose to forego some, or all, of these
rights in order to bargain with the government.
B.

The Rise and Predominance of Plea Bargains45

Although jury trials are championed in American
jurisprudence, defendants may forego a trial in favor of entering a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere.46 In fact, over 95% of all criminal
cases in state courts are resolved by a guilty plea,47 and up to 97%
of federal criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargains.48

41 Id. at 465; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975) (holding
that a defendant may represent himself).
42 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463.
43 See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 452 (proof beyond a reasonable doubt essentially amounts to
the guarantee that the government has rebutted the presumption of innocence).
45 The term plea bargain has been defined as “any agreement between the
prosecutor and the defendant whereby a defendant agrees to perform some act or
service in exchange for more lenient treatment by the prosecutor.” Michael D. Cicchini,
Broken Government Promises: A Contract-Based Approach to Enforcing Plea Bargains,
38 N.M. L. REV. 159, 160 (2008) (quoting State v. Thompson, 426 A.2d 14, 15 n.1 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1981)).
46 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see also Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched
Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717,
718 (2006) (“Both the states and the federal government permit defendants to forego
adjudication by entering pleas of guilty, or nolo contendere.”). A plea of nolo contendere
(“I do not wish to contend”) allows a defendant to neither contest nor admit guilt. Nolo
Contendere, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see Plea, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A nolo contendere plea is often used where criminal
defendants may also face civil liability for the same underlying act or omission.
47 Ross, supra note 46, at 717.
48 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 289 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part). For further discussion of the prevalence of plea bargaining in the federal criminal
justice system, see Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 88-91 (2005), and Hon. Patrick E. Higginbotham,
Mahon Lecture, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 501, 503 n.12 (2006).
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs the process
of entering a plea.49 It sets out stringent guidelines a court must
follow before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The
court must address the defendant personally in open court and
inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands, a litany of rights.50 First and foremost, the defendant
must be advised that he or she has the right to plead not guilty and
persist in such a plea.51 The defendant must be made aware of the
rights he or she would be guaranteed at trial: the right to
representation by counsel (appointed by the court if necessary),
the right to a trial by jury, the right to “confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses,” the right to testify and present
evidence (as well as the competing right not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself or herself), and the right to compel the
appearance of witnesses.52
The court must also include in its colloquy with the
defendant that the defendant waives the aforementioned trial
rights, the nature of any charge to which the defendant is
pleading, any maximum possible penalties the defendant may
face—fine, imprisonment and post release supervision—as well as
any mandatory minimum penalties, applicable forfeiture, and the
court’s ability to order restitution or “obligation to impose a
special assessment.”53 The court must ensure that the defendant
is aware of the method by which the court will compute the
defendant’s sentence.54 It is also incumbent upon the court to
inform the defendant of any provisions in the plea agreement in
which the defendant waives the right to appeal or “collaterally
attack the sentence.”55 Finally, a defendant who is not a U.S.
citizen must understand that if convicted, the defendant may face
a host of immigration consequences.56
The court is also required to ensure that a plea is voluntary
and determine the factual basis for the plea.57 A defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea “(1) before the court accepts the plea, for
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B).
52 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C)-(E).
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(F)-(L).
54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M) (stating that the court is obligated to
“calculate the applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range,
possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”).
55 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(O) (stating that a defendant may “be removed
from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States
in the future”).
57 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2)-(3).
49
50

1246

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:3

any reason or no reason; or (2) after the court accepts the plea, but
before it imposes sentence” if the court rejects the plea or the
defendant shows just cause.58 After the court has imposed a
sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty; it can
only be set aside on direct appeal or collateral attack.59
The Supreme Court outlined the potential benefits of the
guilty plea and often concomitant plea bargain in Blackledge v.
Allison.60 The Court noted that the defendant “avoids extended
pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a
trial, he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to
acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever
potential there may be for rehabilitation.”61 Furthermore, it
promotes judicial economy and conservation of prosecutorial
resources.62 Finally, the general public need not be further
subjected to the risk of offenders “who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings.”63
The Supreme Court has not, however, focused solely on
the benefits of the plea bargaining process. In Brady v. United
States, where the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea must be
knowing and voluntary, the Court cautioned that “a guilty plea is a
grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and
discernment.”64 The Court further emphasized that “[c]entral to the
plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the
defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court that he
committed the acts charged in the indictment.”65 Thus, where a
criminal defendant is forced to stand as a witness against himself,
though normally shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being
compelled to do precisely that, there must be a “minimum
requirement that his plea be the voluntary expression of his own
choice.”66 A defendant’s plea is not only an admission of past
conduct, but it is his or her “consent that judgment of conviction
may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before
a jury or a judge.”67 Despite this rhetoric, guilty pleas are usually

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
60 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
61 Id. at 71.
62 Id.
63 Id. (footnote omitted).
64 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. For discussion of additional negative aspects of plea bargains, see generally
Ross, supra note 46, at 723-25 (reviewing a range of criticisms of the plea bargaining
process, from pressure on innocent defendants, to the influence of gamesmanship, to the fact
that the system is as “irrational in its mercies as in its rigors”).
58

59

2016]

WAIVE GOODBYE TO APPELLATE REVIEW

1247

not accepted with such solemnity.68 Criminal defendants often
lack the resources, sophistication, and adequate representation69
to proceed to trial or negotiate the best possible bargain.
Therefore, the government’s inclusion of waivers of appellate
rights further isolates the plea-bargaining process and written
plea agreements from adequate oversight and judicial review.
C.

Analyzing Written Plea Agreements and Their Validity:
Contractual Principles

When a defendant pleads guilty, the terms are generally
also laid out in a written plea agreement between the prosecution
and the defendant. These written agreements are evaluated
pursuant to civil contract law, despite arising in the criminal
context.70 “A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”71 Therefore the
law governing contracts is particularly apposite to plea
agreements: such agreements set forth the promises the
government makes to a defendant and the promises the
defendant makes in return.72
The Supreme Court has maintained that “plea agreements
must be construed in light of the rights and obligations created

68 For example, in border states, the federal government employs what are known
as “fast-track” programs, which would provide for disposition within 30 days of the
defendant’s arrest. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice to All United States Attorneys 1, 3 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf [http://perma.cc/KYP7-CREC].
69 Those defendants who cannot afford to retain private counsel will be
appointed counsel. Unfortunately, however, these attorneys often have too many cases
and not enough time or money. Five Problems Facing Public Defense on the 40th
Anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, NLADA, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_
Gideon/Defender_Gideon_5_Problems [http://perma.cc/CPK3-6CL5] (last visited Apr. 17,
2016). National standards, for example, “limit felony cases to 150 a year per attorney. Yet
felony caseloads of 500, 600, 800, or more are common.” Id.
70 United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing United
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 535 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008)). Even though plea bargains
resolve criminal matters, they are still just that—bargains. Therefore, they are
governed by the law regulating agreements: contract law.
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
72 Often, such promises take the following form: the defendant agrees to accept
responsibility for one or more of the charges in the indictment (or lesser variations
thereof) and possibly to cooperate with the government. In return, the government
dismisses or reduces certain charges or agrees to suggest a lesser sentence for the charge
to which the defendant pleads. Kevin Bennardo, United States v. Erwin and the Folly of
Intertwined Cooperation and Plea Agreements, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 160, 16162 (2014); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 16, at 1909 (stating that when a defendant
agrees to plead guilty, “the defendant relinquishes the right to go to trial . . . while the
prosecutor gives up the entitlement to seek the highest sentence or pursue the most
serious charges possible”).

1248

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:3

by the Constitution.”73 Defendants and prosecutors, like the
parties to a standard executory contract, do not necessarily
trade entitlements; rather, they exchange the risk that future
events or circumstances will cause either party to regret
concluding the earlier bargain.74 The plea bargaining process
reassigns the risks that each party must consider.75 Prior to plea
bargaining, defendants assume the risk inherent in going to
trial—conviction with the maximum sentence imposed. The
government, on the other hand, bears a reciprocal risk that the
expenditure of limited resources on a trial will nevertheless
result in an acquittal.76 Once the parties reach a plea agreement,
however, there is an inversion of risk. Now the defendant risks a
favorable result at trial—an acquittal or a lighter sentence—
while the prosecutor risks having foregone the possibility of
procuring a more severe sentence at trial.77
Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, two law professors
from the University of Virginia, argue that participants in a plea
bargain may also realize gains that have social value.78 Plea
bargaining, they contend, “provides a means by which prosecutors
can obtain a larger net return from criminal convictions, holding
resources constant. Criminal defendants, as a group, are able to
reduce the risk of the imposition of maximum sanctions.”79 These
scholars maintain that “the existence of entitlements implies the
right to exploit those entitlements fully, which in turn implies the
right to trade the entitlement or any of its associated risks.”80
Viewing plea bargaining as a systematic approach, rather than
simply analyzing each individual defendant’s case, may reveal a
more balanced view of the institution. Overall, society may thus
deem the criminal justice system’s reliance on the negotiation
process more legitimate and “normatively acceptable.”81
Arguably, contract law “is broader in scope and offers
greater protection than the Constitution.”82 In fact, the defendant
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 16 (1987).
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1914 (1992).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1915.
79 Id.
80 Id. This argument does, however, suffer from a few drawbacks. For
example, as a democratic society, we do not generally approve of giving the government
the power to “exploit” anything fully. Furthermore, we would not want defendants
wielding such great power either; though everyone is presumed innocent until proven
guilty, the prosecution should not allow a defendant to use constitutional safeguards as
weapons of manipulation.
81 Id.
82 Cicchini, supra note 45, at 173.
73

74
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waives numerous constitutional guarantees in order to plead
guilty.83 “[T]he Constitution is only effective in cases where the
prosecutor reneges after the defendant enters a plea[;] contract
law applies from the much earlier point where the parties
actually reach an agreement.”84 Therefore, contract law provides
the most suitable and flexible standards for evaluating and
enforcing plea agreements.85
1. Contracts, Generally
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a
contract “is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty.”86 If a contract term, provision, or
entire agreement is ambiguous or subject to multiple reasonable
constructions, “that meaning is generally preferred which
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom
a writing otherwise proceeds.”87 In the case of a plea agreement,
the prosecution will generally draft the document, and therefore
any ambiguity should be construed against the government. The
comment following section 206 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts provides the rationale for so construing contractual
terms: “Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is
likely to provide more carefully for the protection of his own
interests than for those of the other party. He is also more likely
than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of
meaning.”88 Critically, the rule is invoked in situations paralleling
those found in the criminal justice system—those in which the
drafting party (i.e., the government) has the stronger bargaining
position and in cases of standardized contracts.89
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Cicchini, supra note 45, at 173-74.
85 Id.; see also Ross, supra note 46, at 725 (“[D]efenders of plea bargaining
sometimes invoke the models of contract law and economic theory to characterize plea
agreements as voluntary transactions that maximize the welfare of both parties.”);
Guilty Pleas, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 424, 443-45 (2011) (“[W]hether a
party has breached a plea agreement is governed by the law of contracts. However,
concerns unique to the criminal justice system lead to greater scrutiny by courts . . . .
Due process requires that the agreement be interpreted in keeping with a defendant’s
reasonable understanding and that any ambiguity be construed against the
government.” (footnotes omitted)).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
87 Id. § 206.
88 Id. § 206 cmt. a.
89 Id. Often, the government has a general template for its plea agreements
that it adapts to each individual criminal case and defendant. Government Response in
Opposition to Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, United States v.
Martinez, Nos. 3:05CR00781, 3:10CV831, 2010 WL 4218511 (N.D. Ohio July 20, 2010)
(“When the government drafts a defendant’s plea agreement, it is created from a
83
84
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2. Breach of Contract: When Is a Breach Material?
A plea agreement, like many contracts, obligates both
parties to perform. The Supreme Court has held that “when a
defendant is induced to plea bargain chiefly because of a
prosecutor’s promises, such promises must be fulfilled.”90 On the
other hand, “if a defendant materially breaches the terms of a
plea bargain,” the government is released from its promises.91
A contract is deemed to be breached when there is a
“[v]iolation of a contractual obligation by failing to perform one’s
own promise, by repudiating it, or by interfering with another
party’s performance.”92 Every breach gives rise to some form of
remedy in the other party.93 A breach may be active or passive,
anticipatory or continuing, constructive, partial, or material, or
even efficient.94 In the context of plea bargaining, the most
important type of breach is a material breach.
A material breach has been defined as one that is
“significant enough to permit the aggrieved party to elect to
treat the breach as total (rather than partial), thus excusing
that party from further performance and affording it the right to
sue for damages.”95 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists
the following factors a court may consider in determining the
materiality of an alleged breach:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected;
standard template; the government then inserts and deletes paragraphs and tailors the
language to fit that particular defendant’s negotiated facts, stipulations, and his
anticipated criminal offense level and criminal history category.”).
90 Julie A. Lumpkin, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a
Defendant Has Materially Breached a Plea Agreement, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1987).
91 Id.
92 Breach of Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
93 Id.
94 See id. An active breach amounts to “acting outside of the contract’s terms,”
whereas a passive breach involves a “failure to perform the requirements of a contract.”
An anticipatory breach is one in which a party indicates that he or she “will not perform
when performance is due” but a continuing breach “endures for a considerable [amount
of] time.” Id. A constructive, or anticipatory, breach is one “caused by a party’s
anticipatory repudiation, i.e., unequivocally indicating that the party will not perform
when performance is due.” Id. A partial breach is one that is “less significant than a
material breach and that gives the aggrieved party a right to damages, but does not
excuse that party from performance; specif., a breach for which the injured party may
substitute the remedial rights provided by law for only part of the existing contract
rights.” Id. A material breach, on the other hand, is “significant enough to permit the
aggrieved party to elect to treat the breach as total (rather than partial), thus excusing
that party from further performance and affording it the right to sue for damages.” Id.
Finally, an efficient breach consists of an “intentional breach of contract and payment of
damages by a party who would incur greater economic loss by performing under the
contract.” Id.
95 Id.
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(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated
for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances
including any reasonable assurances; [and]
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform
or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and
fair dealing.96

Materiality is so important in the plea agreement context
because a material breach of the plea agreement by either party
may have significant consequences. For example, if a defendant
agrees to cooperate by providing testimony against coconspirators,
but refuses to take the stand when he or she is supposed to testify,
that will often be treated as a material breach of the agreement. If
so, the government will likely be able to revoke the deal, avoid
double jeopardy concerns, and pursue further charges or harsher
penalties for the crimes to which the defendant has already
pleaded guilty. On the other hand, the converse would likely be
true as well. If a defendant agrees to plead guilty and cooperates
in exchange for a reduced sentence, but the government fails to
suggest such a sentence, the government will have breached the
agreement. These breaches are deemed grave enough that they
deprive one party of the benefit of the bargain. Following a
breach, the court must determine the appropriate remedy for the
aggrieved party.
3. Available Remedies for Breach
There are numerous available remedies for a breach of
contract.97 In offering a wide variety of remedies, several interests
of the nonbreaching party are being protected, including his
interest in receiving the benefit of his bargain, his interest in
having any benefit he conferred on the other party restored to
him, and his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by his
detrimental reliance on the agreement.98
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. § 1 cmt. e (“The legal remedies available when a promise is broken are
of various kinds. Direct remedies of damages, restitution and specific performance are
the subject of Chapter 16 [of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS]. Whether or
not such direct remedies are available, the law may recognize the existence of legal
duty in some other way such as recognizing or denying a right, privilege or power
created or terminated by the promise.”).
98 Id. § 344.
96

97
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A judgment or court order may provide for:
(a) awarding a sum of money due under the contract or as damages,
(b) requiring specific performance of a contract or enjoining its nonperformance,
(c) requiring restoration of a specific thing to prevent unjust
enrichment,
(d) awarding a sum of money to prevent unjust enrichment,
(e) declaring the rights of the parties, and
(f)

enforcing an arbitration award.99

In the context of plea agreements, however, the relevant remedy
is that of specific performance.100 Specific performance is defined
as “[t]he rendering, as nearly as practicable, of a promised
performance through a judgment or decree; specif[ically], a courtordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of a legal or
contractual obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate
or inadequate.”101 It is a discretionary, equitable remedy.102
Specific performance is not the default remedy for breach
of contract—quite the contrary. Therefore, it will be refused if
such relief is unfair because “(a) the contract was induced by
mistake or by unfair practices, (b) the relief would cause
unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach or to third
persons, or (c) the exchange is grossly inadequate or the terms of
the contract are otherwise unfair.”103 It will only be granted if
failure to do so “would be unfair because it would cause
unreasonable hardship or loss to the party seeking relief or to
third persons.”104 Essentially, the question of whether specific
performance is the appropriate remedy is one of fairness.
D.

A Standard Plea Agreement Provision: Waiver of the
Right to Appeal

A provision that has become standard fare in plea
agreements is one that purportedly waives the defendant’s
statutory right to appeal. Both the Federal Rules of Criminal
Id. § 345.
After all, although the parties negotiating a plea agreement are dealing in
things of value, the value is not measured in dollars. The important consideration is
whether each party has received the benefit of his or her bargain.
101 Specific Performance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
102 Id.
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
104 Id. § 364(2).
99

100
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Procedure and federal statutes generally give criminal defendants
the right to appeal their conviction or sentence.105 Even when a
defendant pleads guilty, certain issues may survive and be raised
on appeal.106 Such issues include (1) whether “the plea was
knowing and voluntary,” (2) “whether the defendant received
effective assistance of counsel,” (3) constitutional claims (i.e.,
double jeopardy), (4) claims provided by statute, and (5) cases “in
which an appeal waiver is taken in the absence of an actual guilty
plea” (i.e., during sentencing).107 If a criminal defendant wishes to
voluntarily and knowingly waive the right to appeal, whether
during the plea itself or at sentencing, federal and state courts
have upheld the right to do so.108 The Supreme Court, however,
has yet to address the validity of such waiver provisions.109
1. Waiver, Generally
“A person waives a right when he or she voluntarily
relinquishes it.”110 Thus, a person must first possess a right he or
she could theoretically exercise; second, the person must
consciously decide to forfeit or give up the exercise of that
right.111 Admittedly, rights may be waived generally, or for
more limited purposes.112 Occasionally, the relinquished rights
are inconsequential to a particular defendant.113 In the
alternative, the waiver might carry weighty consequences, despite
being made quickly and with little consideration.114 The best-case
scenario would involve the waiver of rights only after thoughtful
deliberation and professional advice.115
Broadly speaking, courts disapprove of inferred waivers of
constitutional rights.116 Thus, the accused must “engage[ ] in
conduct which may be characterized as ‘an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”117
See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j).
Calhoun, supra note 10, at 131-34.
107 Id. at 132-33.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 896 (2d Cir. 1992); Johnson
v. United States, 838 F.2d 201, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1988).
109 Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 211 (2005).
110 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 804 (2003).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. For example, a criminal defendant with a lengthy criminal history may not
bat an eyelash at relinquishing his right to testify for fear of impeachment on the stand.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 412 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
117 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 524 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
105

106
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In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court considered whether the
right to counsel was waived. Its analytical framework has been
universally applied to other constitutional and statutory rights
the accused has allegedly foregone.
“[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we “do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”
....

. . . This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the . . . judge of determining whether there is an
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may
waive [particular] right[s] . . . , whether there is a proper waiver should
be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and
appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.118
Procedural safeguards thus ensure that defendants understand
and appreciate the gravity of the rights they forego and that
such understanding is memorialized in a written record.
2. Allocution to Determine a Waiver’s Validity
Because a court will generally enforce an appellate waiver
that has been deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it is
important to consider just how a court makes such a
determination. Before accepting a guilty plea, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, a court must engage in an on-therecord colloquy with the defendant to ensure that he or she
understands the binding plea agreement and is entering into it
voluntarily.119 Such a colloquy should include a discussion of the
waiver of the right to appeal, even if no particular litany or
recitation is required.120
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
considered the adequacy of such a colloquy and the resulting
validity of an appellate waiver in United States v. Buchanan.121
The appellate waiver provision in the defendant’s signed plea
agreement, as well as the colloquy in which the court and
defendant engaged, are reproduced in pertinent part below to
118 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S.
292, 307 (1937)).
119 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); United States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005, 1007
(11th Cir. 1997).
120 Buchanan, 131 F.3d at 1008; see Hoeft v. Laclair, No. 08-CV-6060 VEB,
2011 WL 1198763, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011).
121 Buchanan, 131 F.3d at 1006, 1007-08.
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provide an example of appropriate measures taken by a trial
court. The agreement stated:
[T]he defendant agrees that this Court has jurisdiction and authority
to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum set forth for
the offense and pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, and expressly
waives the right to appeal defendant’s sentence, directly or
collaterally, on any ground except for an upward departure by the
sentencing judge or a sentence above the statutory maximum or a
sentence in violation of the law apart from the sentencing guidelines;
provided, however, that if the government exercises its right to
appeal the sentence imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b),
the defendant is released from this waiver and may appeal the
sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).122

Before accepting the defendant’s plea, the District Court
conducted the requisite Rule 11 colloquy.
THE COURT: The other thing you need to understand about this
plea agreement is that it contains a provision where you are waiving
your right to appeal. This U.S. attorney’s office places this provision
in its plea agreement. That’s real important that you understand
that when you go into sentencing and you get sentenced to
something, even if it’s worse than you think you should get, or even
if its [sic] something that you really don’t like, if it’s a legal sentence
and it’s within the guidelines, you don’t have a right to appeal that
sentence under this plea agreement; do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The only way that you can take an appeal of the
sentence that you get in this case is going to be if, one, it’s an illegal
sentence, or, two, if the judge does an upward departure.
If the Court—if the guidelines are calculated to be at this level, and
he goes above that, you have a right under this plea agreement to
take an appeal; otherwise you have no right to appeal unless the
Government decides for some reason it needs to appeal. And if that
happens, then you can also take an appeal.
What this means practically is that if you show up, even if Judge
Adams determines the guidelines to be higher than you think they
are, his determination counts. And if he sentences you within those
guidelines, you are not going to be able to appeal that sentence no
matter how much you dislike them; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.123

The court held that this waiver—which was clear and
unambiguous—was knowingly and voluntarily entered into.124
122
123
124

Id. at 1006-07 (citing the written plea agreement).
Id. at 1007.
Id.
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Thus, the court enforced the waiver provision and dismissed
the defendant’s appeal.125
In essence, a colloquy must comport with the guidelines in
Rule 11, and a defendant must understand the rights he or she is
foregoing. If the allocution satisfies these requirements, the
defendant’s waiver will be deemed knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary, and therefore valid. Although the colloquy above is
acceptable and can be used as a model for other federal judges, it
must not be replicated verbatim. This theoretically guarantees
that any given colloquy will reflect the specific facts and
circumstances pertinent to each individual defendant before the
court, thereby increasing the likelihood that the specific
defendant fully understands the rights he or she is relinquishing.
There may, however, be circumstances in which a defendant
knowingly waives his or her right to appeal but should be allowed
to file an appeal nonetheless.
3. The Third Circuit’s “Miscarriage of Justice” Standard
Even in the face of a valid waiver, however, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has created an exception allowing
for review of procedurally barred issues in certain instances. In
United States v. Khattak, the Third Circuit declined to blindly
prohibit the review of all arguments on appeal that would
otherwise be precluded by a valid waiver of the right to appeal.126
The court determined that “[t]here may be an unusual
circumstance where an error amounting to a miscarriage of
justice may invalidate the waiver.”127 Other federal circuits have
expressly identified such “unusual circumstances” that would
justify reaching the merits of an appeal: where (1) a sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum penalty, (2) a sentence is based
on constitutionally impermissible factors (e.g., race),128 (3) a
defendant claims he or she has received ineffective assistance of
counsel,129 or (4) waiver provisions are “too broad to be valid.”130
The Third Circuit has declined to provide specific examples.131
Instead, the Third Circuit adopted an approach similar
to that employed by the First Circuit, setting forth certain

Id. at 1007-09.
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001).
127 Id.
128 United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000).
129 United States v. Joiner, 183 F.3d 635, 645 (7th Cir. 1999).
130 Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (citing United States v. Goodman, 165 F.3d 169,
174 (2d Cir. 1999)).
131 Id. at 563.
125

126
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factors to consider before disregarding the defendant’s waiver.
Those factors include:
The clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it
concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum),
the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the
error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant
acquiesced in the result. 132

These factors may be useful in guiding a reviewing court’s
determination of when a particular sentencing error warrants the
vacatur of an otherwise valid appeal waiver.133 The court
emphasized, however, that the governing standard in these cases
remains “whether the error would work a miscarriage of justice.”134
II.

UNITED STATES V. ERWIN

The issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in United States v. Erwin was one of remedies. Specifically,
the court addressed whether the government could enforce a plea
agreement by specific performance where a criminal defendant
violated his plea agreement by filing an appeal, despite executing a
voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to appeal.135
On May 9, 2011, the government filed a sealed criminal
complaint against Christopher Erwin and 21 others in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey.136 Each defendant
was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute oxycodone.137 Erwin, one of the defendants, had
managed a large-scale oxycodone distribution ring in New Jersey
for approximately two years, illegally selling hundreds of
thousands of oxycodone tablets on the black market.138 Erwin
executed a written plea agreement with the prosecution in May
2012.139 He agreed to plead guilty to a one-count information
charging him with the oxycodone distribution conspiracy, and the
government promised not to bring further criminal charges.140
Schedule A of the plea agreement established that under
the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant’s offense

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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level was 39.141 The plea agreement thus does not provide for a
specific period of incarceration, but rather outlines the procedure
by which the court would arrive at an appropriate sentence.142 If
the court adhered to the parameters set forth in the plea
agreement, the defendant could not appeal his sentence or other
provisions of his guilty plea.143 The waiver of the defendant’s right
to appeal was contained in paragraph 8 of Schedule A:
Christopher Erwin knows that he has and, except as noted below in
this paragraph, voluntarily waives, the right to file any
appeal, . . . including but not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 . . . , which challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing
court if that sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that
results from a total Guidelines offense level of 39. This Office [the
United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey] will not file
any appeal, motion[,] or writ which challenges the sentence imposed
by the sentencing court if that sentence falls within or above the
Guidelines range that results from a total Guidelines offense level of
39. The parties reserve any right they may have under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 to appeal the sentencing court’s determination of the criminal
history category. The provisions of this paragraph are binding on the
parties even if the Court employs a Guidelines analysis different
from that stipulated to herein. Furthermore, if the sentencing court
accepts a stipulation, both parties waive the right to file an
appeal . . . claiming that the sentencing court erred in doing so.144

Both the government and the defendant reserved the right to
“oppose or move to dismiss” any appeal that fell within the
scope of the waiver.145
In addition to the plea agreement, the defendant entered
into a written cooperation agreement, providing that in the event
the defendant “substantially assisted in the investigation or
criminal prosecution of others,” the government would seek a
downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range.146 The
plea and cooperation agreements, taken together, “constituted the
full and complete agreement” between the government and the

141 Id. at 223-24. “Each type of crime is assigned a base offense level, which is the
starting point for determining the seriousness of a particular offense. More serious types of
crime have higher base offense levels . . . .” An Overview of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/
overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BDW-KPW8] (last
visited May 18, 2016). With an offense level of 39 and a criminal history score of 0-1, the
defendant may have faced a sentence of 262-327 months. Sentencing Table (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/2012/manual-pdf/Sentencing_Table.pdf [http://perma.cc/US59-2ZDG].
142 See Erwin, 765 F.3d at 224.
143 See id.
144 Id.
145 Id. (quoting ¶ 9 of Schedule A of the plea agreement).
146 Id.
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defendant.147 The cooperation agreement also provided that if the
defendant were to “violate any provision of this cooperation
agreement or the plea agreement,” the government “will be
released from its obligations under this agreement and the plea
agreement, including any obligation to file” the downward
departure motion.148 “In addition, [the defendant] shall thereafter
be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which
[the prosecution] has knowledge. . . .”149
In the months after the agreements were executed, the
defendant did offer “‘important and timely’ assistance” to the
government; in return, the government wrote a letter to the court
asking for the downward departure contemplated in the
cooperation agreement.150 In assessing the appropriate sentence,
the district court agreed with the parties and the presentence
investigation report that
[the defendant’s] total offense level of 39 and criminal history category of
I yielded an initial Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months of
imprisonment. The court noted that [defendant’s] sentence was “capped
at” 240 months “because of the statutory maximum.” Citing its July
letter to the court, the Government then moved for a five-level
downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The Government
clarified that, to the extent there “may be some question as to where to
start,” it was requesting a departure from offense level 39 to offense
level 34, as opposed to from the statutory maximum of 240 months.
Erwin did not object, and the court granted the Government’s motion.151

Ultimately, the court could impose a minimum of 151 months and
a maximum of 188 months of imprisonment.152 The court elected to
impose the maximum term of imprisonment, as well as a term of
three years supervised release and a $100 special assessment.153
In response, the defendant filed a timely appeal, arguing
that the district court erred in its application of the downward
departure by starting at an offense level of 39, because when
combined with his criminal history, the Guidelines range was
higher than the statutory maximum sentence.154 The government
did not move for dismissal based on the appellate waiver, nor did
it cross-appeal. Instead, the prosecution argued that the

147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. (quoting supp. app. 46).
Id. (quoting supp. app. 48) (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting supp. app. 48).
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendant should be resentenced de novo, where the government
would seek a “modest increase” in sentence.155
The Third Circuit would not reach the merits of defendant’s
appeal if “(1) the issues raised fall within the scope of the appellate
waiver; and (2) he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the
appellate waiver; unless (3) enforcing the waiver would ‘work a
miscarriage of justice.’”156 The court held that the defendant’s
waiver of his right to appeal was knowing and voluntary and that
the appeal “fit[ ] squarely within the scope of the waiver.”157
The court next considered whether or not the enforcement
of the appellate waiver would constitute an “error amounting to a
miscarriage of justice.”158 The court reviewed the defendant’s
claims of constitutional and procedural error, but determined that
they were of no avail.159 The court reasoned that “[e]ven assuming
the District Court erred procedurally . . . , its arguably erroneous
calculation would be ‘precisely the kind of “garden variety” claim
of error contemplated by [an] appellate waiver.’”160 Ultimately, the
court concluded that enforcing the waiver against the defendant
would work no miscarriage of justice.161
Once the court determined that it would not consider the
merits of the defendant’s appeal, the court contemplated the
appropriate remedy available to the government.162 The court
acknowledged that in general, where a valid waiver bars the
issues raised by a defendant’s appeal, the court would dismiss the
appeal, thereby upholding the defendant’s sentence.163 It did,
however, entertain (and ultimately agree with) the government’s
argument that a mere dismissal of the defendant’s appeal “would
neither make the Government whole for the costs it has incurred
because of [the defendant’s] breach nor adequately deter other
cooperating defendants from similar breaches.”164 Specifically, the
government moved the court to vacate the defendant’s sentence
and allow the government to pursue the remedies outlined in the

155 Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 34, United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3407)).
156 Id. (quoting United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 2014)).
157 Id. at 226.
158 Id. (quoting United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001)).
159 Id. at 226-27.
160 Id. at 227 (quoting United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2013)).
161 Id. at 228.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for Appellee at 16, United States v.
Erwin, 765 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3407)).
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breach provision of the plea agreement.165 The defendant argued
that if the court were to grant the relief requested by the
government, it “would, as a practical matter, end this [c]ourt’s
review for miscarriage of justice, as defendants would be wary to
appeal even in the most egregious cases of error.”166
The Third Circuit also addressed three related questions:
(1) whether the defendant did in fact breach the plea agreement,
(2) if so, whether one of the remedies specified in the breach
provision—resentencing—was appropriate, and (3) whether the
cross-appeal rule divested the court of jurisdiction to grant
resentencing.167 The court quickly dispensed with the first question;
the defendant breached the plea agreement because he promised
not to appeal his sentence and subsequently did.168 The Third
Circuit held that specific performance (i.e., de novo resentencing)
was warranted.169 It found this remedy especially feasible in light of
the detailed breach provision in the plea agreement.170
In so holding, the court emphasized the “bargained for
exchange” between the parties: the defendant agreed to plead
guilty and cooperate with the government in order to secure
convictions against his codefendants. Furthermore, the defendant
waived most aspects of his right to appeal his sentence, thereby
conserving prosecutorial resources.171 The government, on the
165 Id. Such remedies would include withdrawing its motion for a downward
departure during sentencing and bringing additional criminal charges. The government
indicated that given the choice, it would withdraw its motion. Id.
166 Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 10, United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-3407)).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 229. In fact, the court relegated its brief discussion of this issue to
footnotes 5 and 6 of the decision. It rejected the defendant’s argument that waiving his right
to file an appeal was separate and distinct from promising not to file one. Id. at 229 n.5.
Furthermore, it rejected the proposition that the breach was not material. Id. at 229 n.6.
The court determined that the defendant’s “breach defeated the parties’ bargained-for
objective and deprived the government of a substantial part of its benefit.” Id.
169 Id. at 231. In finding this remedy not only available to the government, but also
appropriate, the court focused on the classic rule of contract law providing that “a party
should be prevented from benefitting from its own breach.” Id. at 230 (quoting Assaf v.
Trinity Med. Ctr., 696 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2012)). In the criminal context, the court
believed that its “failure to enforce a plea agreement against a breaching defendant ‘would
have a corrosive effect on the plea agreement process’ by ‘render[ing] the concept of a
binding agreement a legal fiction.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416,
422-23 (3d Cir. 2007)). The court further stressed the importance of the plea bargaining
process and its benefits: the defendant’s case is resolved quickly and with a sense of
certainty, judges and prosecutors conserve resources, and the public is protected from
potentially dangerous offenders. Id. In order for the benefits of plea bargaining to be
realized, however, “dispositions by guilty plea [must be] accorded a great measure of
finality.” Id. (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)). According to the court,
“Appellate waivers exist precisely because they preserve the finality of judgments and
sentences imposed pursuant to valid guilty pleas.” Id.
170 Id. at 231.
171 Id. at 230.
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other hand, promised not to bring further criminal charges against
Erwin and to seek a downward departure for his cooperation.172
The court determined that the defendant “received the full benefit
of his bargain,” but the government did not.173 Whereas the
defendant received a quick disposition and reduced sentence, the
government was forced to devote “valuable resources in litigating
an appeal that should never have been filed in the first place.”174
After resolving the remedy question, the court addressed
whether the cross-appeal rule barred de novo resentencing.175 The
cross-appeal rule provides that “a party aggrieved by a decision of
the district court must file an appeal in order to receive relief from
the decision.”176 The court held that the cross-appeal rule was
inapplicable in this instance.177 The court reasoned that the
government could not have filed a cross-appeal because “only a
party aggrieved by a final judgment may appeal” or crossappeal.178 Furthermore, “[t]he Federal Government enjoys no
inherent right to appeal a criminal judgment.”179 The government
could have only appealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which
would have permitted the prosecution to appeal the defendant’s
sentence if it “(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) resulted
from an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines; (3)
departed from the applicable Guideline range; or (4) was plainly
unreasonable, if imposed for an offense where there is no
applicable Guideline.”180 The government could not have appealed
under any of the avenues available via 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b);
therefore, the court would have dismissed any appeal filed by the
government for want of jurisdiction.181
Regardless, the court determined that the remedy the
government
sought—de
novo
resentencing—would
not
substantially affect the rights of the defendant.182 Cleverly, the
court pointed out that the defendant had asked for resentencing;
Id.
Id. at 230-31.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 232.
176 Id. (quoting United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 342
(3d Cir. 1991)).
177 Id.
178 Id. (quoting Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 514 F.2d 931, 934 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Here, the government was not aggrieved by a final judgment. In fact, it arguably got a
better result because the sentence was higher than it might have been. The
government’s complaint here is the fact that the defendant appealed the sentence.
179 Id. (quoting Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 246 (1981)). Neither 28
U.S.C. § 1291 nor 18 U.S.C. § 3731 authorize an appeal or apply in these
circumstances. Id. at 232-33.
180 Id. at 233 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)).
181 Id.
182 Id.
172
173
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the defendant was therefore getting “exactly what he asked for.”183
The court conducted a review of Supreme Court and circuit court
precedent, which enabled the court to reinforce its decision.184
First, the court considered Greenlaw v. United States, decided by
the Supreme Court in 2008.185 There, the Court held that where a
defendant unsuccessfully challenges his sentence as excessive, a
Court of Appeals could not sua sponte increase the sentence
absent a governmental cross-appeal.186 The Third Circuit
distinguished Greenlaw on the basis that the government in the
present case did not deliberately disregard a sentencing error (as
occurred in Greenlaw), and the defendant should have foreseen
the possibility that the government would seek redress for a
breach of the plea agreement.187
The Third Circuit also considered precedent from its sister
circuits.188 For example, the Seventh Circuit had found that a
defendant’s breach of his appellate waiver provision permits the
prosecution to seek specific performance of the plea agreement,
even without a cross-appeal.189 The Seventh Circuit held that
“dismissal of [the defendant’s] impermissible appeal would be an
‘incomplete response’ because ‘the prosecutorial resources are
down the drain.’”190 Finally, the Third Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ricketts v. Adamson.191 There, the
Court held that a defendant’s breach of the plea agreement
(failing to testify against his coconspirators in their retrial)
subjected him to a first degree murder prosecution not barred by
double jeopardy.192 Ultimately, the Third Circuit determined that
the defendant “made a calculated decision to advance an
interpretation of his appellate waiver that proved erroneous,” and
“[i]t would be unjust to permit him to escape the consequences.”193
Finally, the court considered whether or not it possessed
the authority to remit the matter for de novo resentencing.194 The
court found authority in 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which permits a court
to modify, vacate, set aside, or reverse any judgment lawfully
before it.195 In addition, it allows a court to remand the case for
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id.
Id. at 233-35.
Id. at 233-34 (citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008)).
Id. (citing Greenlaw, 544 U.S. at 248).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235 (quoting United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 589, 862 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Id. (citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987)).
Id. (citing Adamson, 483 U.S. at 8).
Id.
Id.
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012).
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appropriate action under the circumstances.196 A court must
consider any change in fact or law since judgment was entered.197
Applying these principles, the Erwin court held that the validity
of the defendant’s sentence was a matter lawfully before it, and
the defendant’s breach of the plea agreement constituted a
significant change in fact.198 As a result, the court granted the
relief sought by the prosecution, allowing for the possibility of an
increased sentence for the defendant.199
III.

BROADER IMPLICATIONS: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

A.

Flaws in the Third Circuit’s Assumptions and Reasoning

In United States v. Erwin, the Third Circuit began its
analysis like any other case in which a criminal defendant
pleaded guilty, waived his right to appeal, and subsequently filed
an appeal anyway. First, it evaluated whether the defendant’s
waiver was knowing and voluntary. After determining that it
was, the Erwin court also concluded that the appeal before it fell
within the scope of that waiver.200 In light of the facts at bar, the
court rightly decided that enforcing the appellate waiver would
not constitute a miscarriage of justice. The court should have
concluded the inquiry there—case dismissed.
Instead, however, the court considered the government’s—
and likely only the government’s—plea for relief. In so doing, the
Third Circuit erroneously, or at the very least too summarily,
deemed the defendant’s breach a material one. The court
discussed the materiality of the breach in a footnote: “[T]he
breach defeated the parties’ bargained-for objective and deprived
the Government of a substantial part of its benefit.”201 The cases
the court cited seem inapposite—or tenuous analogies at best.
The court cited four cases in support of its determination that the
defendant’s breach was a material one. First, the court cited
Pittsburgh National Bank v. Abdnor.202 The case detailed the
Erwin, 765 F.3d at 235 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106).
Id. (quoting In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 127 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
198 Id. at 235-36.
199 Id. at 236.
200 In so doing, the court neglected the contract law principle that any
ambiguity in an agreement is to be construed against the drafter (i.e., the government).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Erwin’s appeal can
arguably be based on the fact that the language in the agreement is ambiguous as to
the starting point from which the government would move for the downward
departure. Erwin, 765 F.3d at 225. In this case, perhaps the court could have found
that Erwin’s appeal was not barred by the appellate waiver provision.
201 Erwin, 765 F.3d at 229 n.6.
202 Id. (citing Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank v. Abdnor, 898 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1990)).
196

197

2016]

WAIVE GOODBYE TO APPELLATE REVIEW

1265

federal standard for determining the materiality of a breach of
contract, namely
(1) [w]hether the breach operated to defeat the bargained-for objective
of the parties; (2) whether the breach caused disproportionate
prejudice to the non-breaching party; (3) whether custom and usage
considers such a breach to be material; and (4) whether the allowance
of reciprocal non-performance will result in the accrual of an
unreasonable and unfair advantage.203

Pittsburgh National Bank, however, dealt with a loan
agreement and whether or not failure to cash a check under that
agreement was a material breach. The factual circumstances
were not analogous to those in Erwin. Nor were the facts from
Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Products, Inc. analogous to
those in Erwin. There, the district court held that the plaintiff
had committed a material breach by filing suit against the
defendant in violation of mutual general releases of a settlement
agreement between the parties.204 Lastly, the court’s reliance on
Maslow v. Vanguri205 failed to recognize the differences between a
civil and criminal case. The facts were arguably more similar: one
party appealed despite a provision in a civil settlement agreement
not to. In Maslow, however, the court detailed the reasons why it
was clear that the no-appeal provision of the agreement was
central to the parties and was not collateral or an afterthought.206
The parties’ bargained-for-objective is not so readily
ascertainable that it only warrants mention in a two-sentence
footnote. Considerable negotiation is required to enter into both a
plea agreement and a cooperation agreement in a large
conspiracy case. Additionally, the defendant held up the majority
of his bargain: he accepted responsibility and pleaded to the
designated charge, and he provided valuable assistance to the
government. Thus, the court was disingenuous in failing to fully
set forth its reasoning for declaring the breach material.
According to the government’s reply brief, though it could
seek additional charges against Erwin, it only asked the court for
de novo resentencing, at which it would not move for a downward
departure and would seek “only a modest increase in [the
defendant’s] sentence.”207 This would not, however, preclude the
203 Abdnor, 898 F.2d at 338 (quoting E. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank v. Sanders, 826
F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1987)).
204 Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Prods., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355, 1417-18
(E.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 106 F.3d 427 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
205 Erwin, 765 F.3d at 229-30 n.6 (citing Maslow v. Vanguri, 896 A.2d 408
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)).
206 Maslow, 896 A.2d at 423-24.
207 Brief for Appellee at 34, United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2014) (No. 13-3407).
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government from seeking additional charges or more punitive
forms of relief in the future. This is evidenced by the government’s
argument in its reply brief that “[t]he availability of remedies
beyond mere dismissal of the appeal has practical benefits for all
actors in the criminal justice system, particularly ‘other defendants
by enabling them to make believable promises not to appeal.’”208
This presumes the very fact that defendants and the government
are two parties on equal footing and that defendants always
receive valuable consideration for each knowing concession.
Because appellate waiver provisions are essentially standard
form and are unlikely to be negotiable in most instances, this
foundational assumption should be questioned in the context of
appellate waivers. It should also be questioned whether, in this
case specifically and in others, the government’s main objective in
negotiating with defendants is the procurement of a final
disposition (via an appellate waiver) or perhaps, as here,
cooperation. The government in this case benefitted substantially
from the bargain it reached with the defendant, who pleaded
guilty, cooperated fully, and helped the government secure plea
agreements and convictions in numerous other cases associated
with the conspiracy. Notwithstanding the additional time and
expense the government had to dedicate to litigating this
appeal,209 it surely expended substantially fewer resources than it
would have if Erwin’s case had gone to trial.
Lastly, it is clear that the court, at least in part, rendered
this holding not just against this particular criminal defendant,
but also against all of those similarly situated. The penultimate
paragraph of the decision states, “In what has become a common
sequence, a defendant who waived his appellate rights as part of
a plea bargain, and received a substantial benefit in exchange,
has failed to keep his promise.”210 Yet again, the court failed to
recognize that the government (and the courts) still received
substantial benefits, too. The government did not need to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crimes charged at trial. It did not need to pick a jury, put on
witnesses, call experts, or argue a summation. It secured a
conviction. It secured convictions against numerous other
Id. at 33 (quoting United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 589, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2001)).
In failing to move to enforce the appellate waiver, the government
rendered it nonbinding and needlessly protracted the litigation. It seems to this author
that the government strategically appealed this case in order to secure for itself the
remedy of specific performance in future cases. This is further evidenced by the fact
that the government only sought a modest increase in the defendant’s sentence—it did
not want to push its luck too far.
210 Erwin, 765 F.3d at 236 (quoting United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638,
639 (7th Cir. 2002)).
208

209
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defendants involved in the conspiracy as well. Had the prosecution
merely moved to enforce the waiver, the litigation would have been
substantially shorter. In essence, judicial economy and
conservation of prosecutorial resources, while admirable goals
when they can be fulfilled, should not be the guiding principles of
this nation’s jurisprudence. If they become such, this country may
begin down a slippery slope leading to compelled selfincrimination, the abolishment of the adversarial system in favor
of an inquisitorial one, and other such Orwellian measures.
Instead, the Third Circuit should have concluded its analysis once
it determined that Erwin’s appeal fit squarely within the scope of
his valid appellate waiver and enforcing the waiver would not
work a miscarriage of justice. The prosecution should not be able
to use pleas in violation of waivers as a backdoor mechanism for
seeking enhanced criminal sanctions.
B.

A Criminal Defendant Must Be Afforded Due Process

The provisions of the Bill of Rights to the U.S.
Constitution were included to ensure that the tyrannical abuses
suffered under the reign of the English Crown would not endure
in the new nation.211 The intent and centrality of the Due
Process Clause should not be circumvented by the desire for
judicial economy. When Christopher Erwin filed his appeal, he
argued that his sentence was calculated improperly and
therefore should be reduced. Had he lost, Erwin likely assumed
that at worst, his sentence would be upheld. Instead, he was
exposed to further deprivation of liberty—the government would
seek a “modest” increase in his sentence. Even one additional
hour in prison constitutes a further deprivation of liberty under
constitutional principles.
At the heart of the Due Process Clause is the prohibition
of arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests by the government.212
Erwin and future defendants in his position could be further
deprived of liberty simply because they lose their appeal, not
because they have engaged in further illicit conduct or have
211 David A. Lieber, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring Rationale for
Excluding the Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern Incorporation Doctrine, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1098 (2005) (“The addendum of a Bill of Rights
reflected a profound and enduring belief among Anti-Federalists that the Constitution
itself failed to provide sufficient checks on federal power.”).
212 See Due Process Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 519 (2008) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of
the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998))).
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harmed anything other than the government’s purse. A
procedure whereby a defendant must either forfeit his right to
challenge the very validity of the waiver potentially barring
meritorious claims for relief or face a harsher sentence, further
criminal charges, or a complete rescission of a plea agreement he
may have already substantially performed forces a defendant to
make a Hobson’s choice.213
C.

Specific Performance Is Not an Appropriate Remedy

In granting the government’s request for relief in Erwin,
the Third Circuit failed to recognize the door it would open to the
prosecution in the future. Worse yet, perhaps it did. The court
promised to continue to evaluate the validity of appellate waivers
and whether arguments raised on appeal fall within the scope of
those waivers.214 Further, it would “continue to review
conscientiously whether enforcing defendants’ appellate waivers
would yield a miscarriage of justice[,] . . . but . . . any such
defendant must accept the risk that, if he does not succeed,
enforcing the waiver may not be the only consequence.”215
The court failed to realize216 that precisely such a grave
risk will prevent most defendants, even those with meritorious
claims, from pursuing them. No rational defendant—or rational
attorney—will pursue an appeal he may lose if the result would
be additional sanctions. Only those defendants who have faced
treatment that would “shock the conscience” of the court would
even consider raising such a claim.217
Moreover, the court does not consider that other remedies
are available, such as dismissing the appeal. Perhaps it is not as
gratifying a result to the government, but it has proven workable
for years.218 In contract, specific performance is only contemplated
213 A defendant can either (1) appeal his sentence, thus risking violation of the
plea agreement and more severe punishment, or (2) do nothing, thereby accepting an
unjust or illegal sentence. Neither scenario is particularly appealing.
214 Erwin, 765 F.3d at 236.
215 Id.
216 Or at least, the court failed to candidly articulate why it found this
approach to be proper.
217 Most errors are not so egregious, however. For example, a defendant may
be erroneously sentenced to a term of imprisonment that exceeds the statutory
maximum by two years, and while this does not rise to the level of unconscionability, it
may satisfy the criteria for a “miscarriage of justice.”
218 See, e.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 248 (3d Cir. 2011)
(refusing to set aside the defendant’s appeal waiver and dismissing his appeal where
the “sentence imposed by the District Court does not amount to a miscarriage of
justice”); United States v. Snead, 241 F. App’x 62, 66 (3d Cir. 2007) (enforcing appellate
waiver against defendant, “thereby affirming the sentence of the District Court”);
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001) (enforcing defendant’s
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as a discretionary, equitable remedy when alternatives are
inappropriate or inadequate.219
The circumstances in which specific performance is
traditionally denied, such as where “(a) the contract was induced
by mistake or by unfair practices, (b) the relief would cause
unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach or to third
persons, or (c) the exchange is grossly inadequate or the terms of
the contract are otherwise unfair,”220 also support its relative
absence in the criminal justice system. It is likely that appellate
waivers, at least in certain circumstances, are procured by
mistake or unfair practices—they may be a nonnegotiable
provision of the agreement. Allowing the government to seek
harsher penalties against a defendant who believes he has a
meritorious claim could very well cause unreasonable hardship or
loss to that defendant—because additional jail time is a substantial
loss of liberty. Whether the exchanges between prosecution and
defendant are grossly inadequate—a fact-specific inquiry—would
be determined by the court on a case-by-case basis.
In light of these considerations, dismissal of the appeal is
sufficient to restore the government from any loss it may have
suffered as a result of the defendant’s breach of the plea
agreement, which in most circumstances will not be material. The
government seeks the waiver of the right to appeal because it
wishes the disposition to be final and to conserve resources.
Notwithstanding that the government must respond to an appeal
that is barred by waiver, the government still does not have to
prosecute the defendant, nor does the government have to call
witnesses and convince a jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.221 If the government prevails, the merits of the
defendant’s argument will not be reached, and the result will
remain the same. Though concededly imperfect, it is a better
remedy than constructively precluding appellate review of plea
agreements altogether.
D.

Public Policy Disfavors Increased Sanctions

Although it may seem like incarcerating convicted
offenders for longer periods of time, regardless of the mechanism,
serves the public interest, the opposite may actually be true. Our
waiver of his right to appeal, therefore depriving the court of “jurisdiction to consider
the merits of his appeal”).
219 Specific Performance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
220 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
221 Furthermore, a defendant convicted by a jury could still appeal said
conviction or sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012).
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nation’s federal prisons are overcrowded—with some institutions
more than 30% over capacity.222 Longer sentences are not linked
to reducing recidivism, and in fact, they may lead to higher rates
of incarceration.223
Especially in those situations where sentences no longer
serve to rehabilitate offenders, the remaining justifications are
mostly punitive.224 Beginning in the 1980s, “people began to lose
faith in the rehabilitative system, and the focus of sentencing
shifted to a retribution theory.”225 Beginning with the Reagan
administration’s “war on drugs,” Congress passed “a number of
drug statutes that carried mandatory minimum penalties,” and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission was tasked with organizing a
determinate system of sentencing.226 Lengthy mandatory minimum
sentences exacerbate the problems of overcrowding and increase
222 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-743, A REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, BUREAU OF PRISONS, GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS
INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 12 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123.pdf
[http://perma.cc/294Q-2ZVL]. As of 2011, “crowding (or population in excess of rated
capacity” reached levels of 39%. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ “2020 longrange capacity plan projects continued growth in the federal prison population from fiscal
years 2012 through 2020, with systemwide crowding exceeding 45 percent through 2018.”
Id. at intro. As of April 28, 2016, the federal prison system housed 196,134 inmates.
Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
population_statistics.jsp [http://perma.cc/RT5F-N8GA] (last updated Apr. 28, 2016).
223 See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1139 (2010)
(stating that empirical studies “suggest that longer prison terms do not significantly
reduce recidivism and may even be counterproductive”); Don M. Gottfredson, Effects of
Judges’ Sentencing Decisions on Criminal Careers, RES. IN BRIEF, Nov. 1999. (concluding
based on examination of criminal careers of felony offenders sentenced in New Jersey
that sentence length had little effect—other than that of incapacitation—on recidivism);
TIM RIORDAN, POLITICAL & SOC. AFFAIRS DIV., SENTENCING PRACTICES AND RECIDIVISM
(2004) (concluding that available research suggests that sentencing practices do not have
a significant effect on recidivism); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF NON-VIOLENT
DRUG OFFENDERS WITH MINIMAL CRIMINAL HISTORIES (1994) (finding that short prison
sentences are just as likely as long sentences to deter low-level drug offenders with
minimal criminal histories from future offending); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, The
Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug
Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329 (2002) (comparing recidivism rates of felony offenders
sentenced in Kansas City and finding that offenders sentenced to prison have higher
recidivism rates than those sentenced to probation).
224 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012) (Courts “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but
not greater than necessary.” Courts must consider “the need for the sentence imposed (A) to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.”); Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Another Look at SecondLook Sentencing, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 149-52 (2015) (arguing for sentencing reform,
especially in light of “concerns about over-incarceration, excessive punishments, the neglect
of criminal offenders’ humanity, and the fairness of our criminal justice system”).
225 Whitley Zachary, Prison, Money, and Drugs: The Federal Sentencing
System Must Be More Critical in Balancing Priorities Before It Is Too Late, 2 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 323, 326 (2014).
226 Id. at 323.
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prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions,227 thus granting
prosecutors even greater power in the plea bargaining process.
E.

Alternatives to Automatically Allowing Specific Performance

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that an appellate waiver
is only “enforceable to the extent that the government invokes the
waiver provision in [the defendant’s] plea agreement.”228 Where
the government does not object to the defendant’s appeal “based
on his appeal waiver, the waiver is not binding because the
government has waived the issue.”229 Therefore, as a prerequisite
to seeking specific performance of a plea agreement in which the
defendant has allegedly committed a breach, the government
must move to dismiss the appeal. Failure to make such a motion
is a further waste of resources because it forces the judiciary to
reach the merits of the appeal, which is precisely the conundrum
that would be avoided by a motion to dismiss.
If the Third Circuit and its sister circuits wish to
perpetuate a rule of law in which a defendant’s appeal (despite a
waiver of that right) constitutes a material breach punishable by
specific performance, that rule should be limited. There should
also be an intent requirement. Any criminal defendant who files a
frivolous appeal in bad faith, with reckless disregard for judicial
integrity or with solely dilatory intent, should be subject to
sanctions. Instead of treating the appeal as a breach of contract,
the remedy can be one not unlike that provided by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, which allows for sanctions against an attorney
or party who misrepresents information to the court or files
frivolous motions.230 Courts can look to Rule 11 jurisprudence to
guide any such claims in the criminal context, as long as courts
are mindful of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights.
Thus, to establish such a violation, there must always be a
well-developed record that clearly demonstrates that the
defendant’s appellate waiver was entered into knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. In addition, one or more of the
227 Prosecutors enjoy vast discretion in choosing what crime to charge in any
given case. Thus, prosecutors may influence sentencing to a greater degree than they
had before simply by choosing whether to charge a crime to which a mandatory
minimum sentence or sentence enhancement applies. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors
as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 305,
324-25 (2009) (stating that there is “no question that mandatory sentences shifted
enormous sentencing authority to prosecutors” and that “this shift is significant, given
that nearly half of all federal criminal prosecutions involve narcotics or firearms
charges, the main areas in which mandatory sentences apply”).
228 United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006).
229 Id.
230 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
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following conditions must be met: (1) the defendant has no
cognizable meritorious underlying claim, (2) the underlying
appellate claim, even if theoretically barred by waiver, would be
one so minor or inconsequential that it would not work a
miscarriage of justice, or (3) the plea agreement explicitly
recognizes that an appeal within the scope of the waiver would
constitute a material breach.
Alternatively, only in cases where the defendant (or his
counsel) has clearly acted in bad faith, filed a frivolous suit, or
demonstrated an intent to waste the court’s and the government’s
time by filing such an appeal should a defendant’s actions be
treated as a material breach. On the other hand, when a
defendant merely brings a claim and has a weak or losing
argument, the court should not subject him to punishment as
severe as it would impose for intentional or reckless conduct.
A requirement like Rule 11 would force the government to
decide whether this new procedural avenue for enhancing a
criminal defendant’s sentence would be worth it in any given case.
The government would be forced to expend resources to prove the
elements outlined above; thus, in cases where a defendant’s
behavior is particularly noxious, the government may wish to
avail itself of further punishment. But where a defendant’s appeal
is less offensive to the government and is arguably meritorious,
the government may argue that the preservation of prosecutorial
and judicial resources is of paramount concern and merely move
to dismiss the appeal.
CONCLUSION
In the American adversarial system, those citizens—
innocent and guilty alike—who are accused of committing a crime
are provided constitutional safeguards to prevent arbitrary,
discriminatory, or otherwise unjust enforcement of the law.
Unfortunately, however, most criminal defendants do not have
the time, sophistication, or resources to stand resolute on their
rights in the face of the United States of America. Therefore, even
with copiously full dockets, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to
maintain its role as arbiter of justice and fairness.
Because plea bargaining is the predominant method for
disposing of criminal cases, it is critical that there be comparable
levels of judicial oversight and consideration as there would be in
a public trial. Courts should not abandon their impartiality in
order to free up the docket. When a criminal defendant pleads
guilty, waives his right to appeal, and nevertheless appeals, a
federal court must determine whether the waiver is
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constitutionally valid and enforceable. If so, the court should
dismiss the appeal absent demonstrable injustice to the defendant.
Only in the extraordinary cases where it is clear that the
defendant’s motion was frivolous or filed in bad faith or with
dilatory intent should the courts be vested with the authority to
release the government entirely from its obligations under the plea
agreement and return to the status quo ante. Otherwise, the lack of
judicial oversight and appellate review could easily open the door to
governmental abuse in the plea bargaining process. Constitutional
rights could be ignored indiscriminately, and the general public
may lose faith in the government, thereby depriving the criminal
justice system of its legitimacy. Defendants should certainly not be
permitted to waste judicial resources with impunity, but judicial
economy should not be achieved through prosecutorial extortion
that undermines defendants’ constitutional rights.
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